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Abstract
This Essay questions whether Extra Credit Agencies should provide such long-term commer-
cial risk insurance in project finance transactions. It can be argued that ECA-provided commercial
risk insurance in project financings lifts from commercial banks the onus of rigorously analyzing
the commercial risks of a project and that ECAs lack the institutional experience and commercial
orientation to sufficiently appraise a project’s commercial risk. This leads to the very real possi-
bility that projects will be undertaken that on their own (i.e., without commercial risk insurance)
might not be commercially viable.
EXPORT CREDIT AGENCIES, PROJECT
FINANCE, AND COMMERCIAL RISK-
WHOSE RISK IS IT, ANYWAY?
Rodney Short*
INTRODUCTION
Export credit agencies ("ECAs"), such as the United States
Export Import Bank ("U.S. Ex-Im") and the United Kingdom's
Export Credit Guarantee Department ("ECGD"), among many
others, have long offered a mix of export support services and
products, including buyer and supplier export credits and short
to medium term commercial and political export credit insur-
ance. Over time, ECAs have developed a broader array of ser-
vices as they strive to better complement the services and prod-
ucts of the private sector and as they compete against each
other. In recent years, ECAs have begun to offer long-term com-
mercial risk insurance coverage in project finance transactions.
This Essay questions whether ECAs should provide such
long-term commercial risk insurance in project finance transac-
tions. It can be argued that ECA-provided commercial risk in-
surance in project financings lifts from commercial banks the
onus of rigorously analyzing the commercial risks of a project
and that ECAs lack the institutional experience and commercial
orientation to sufficiently appraise a project's commercial risk.
This leads to the very real possibility that projects will be under-
taken that on their own (i.e., without commercial risk insurance)
might not be commercially viable.
I. ECAs OVERVIEW
Official ECAs began with ECGD, established in the United
Kingdom in 1919, and U.S. Ex-Im, dating back to 1933. In the
more than half a century since the end of World War II, a multi-
tude of new ECAs was created as countries around the world
* The author is the Global Head of the WorldWide Projects Group at Clifford
Chance Rogers & Wells LLP. He qualified as a solicitor in England and Wales in 1970
and got his MBA at INSEAD in France in 1974. He is currently based in Washington
D.C. where he is admitted as a Special Legal Counsel. He has represented both spon-
sors and lenders over a period of many years in the development of major infrastruc-
ture projects around the world.
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strove to increase exports.' ECAs are subject to international
regulation by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development ("OECD") "Arrangement "2 and the World Trade
Organization ("WTO") rules (most notably, requiring that ECAs
at least break even), in addition to domestic regulation.
While neither a model nor a precise definition of an ECAs'
activities exists, ECAs traditionally promote exports by providing
either buyer or supplier credits in support of export/import
transactions. In addition, ECAs have long provided short to
long-term political risk insurance, short to medium term com-
mercial risk insurance, and comprehensive coverage relating to
both commercial and political risks, among other products.
ECAs have continually expanded their scope of services and
products in an effort to provide better services to their countries'
exporters (and to compete with other ECAs). ECAs have begun
to offer commercial risk insurance in more complicated and
longer-term transactions, which include aircraft/structured fi-
nance and project finance.
The ECAs' practice of offering commercial risk insurance
(non-payment for commercial reasons) in connection with the
financing of major infrastructure projects grew during the mid-
1990s. This should be clearly distinguished from the ECAs' long-
standing practice of insuring the political risk (expropriation,
currency convertibility, and political violence) associated with
the export of capital goods to be incorporated in major infra-
structure projects (e.g., turbines, boilers, etc.) for a power sta-
tion. The commercial risk of a project's failure was not tradi-
tionally underwritten by ECAs. Policies only covered non-pay-
ment contingent upon specified "political" reasons.
International trade and investment is not a zero sum game;
gains in trade and exports in one country do not necessitate
losses in another country. Nevertheless, there is considerable
competition among the various ECAs, as each supports export-
1. The Berne Union (officially, the International Union of Credit and Investment
Insurers), which promotes cooperation among ECAs (and private insurers), now boasts
45 members both in and out of the OECD.
2. The Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits was
entered into in 1978 as a "gentlemen's agreement" among its participants. It has subse-
quently been incorporated into European Community law. The Arrangement applies to
official support for exports of goods and services that have repayment terms of two or
more years.
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ers from their own country and compete directly with each
other. The OECD Arrangement and WTO rules limit, to some
extent, the array of services that ECAs may provide, but when
one ECA develops a new service or product, the other ECAs will
tend to duplicate such innovation so that their countries' export-
ers will not be at a competitive disadvantage.3 This competitive
dynamic can lead ECAs to search for new products that better
service their country's exporters. As an example of this competi-
tive situation, U.S. Ex-Im is required by its charter to submit an
annual report to Congress detailing its competitiveness with re-
spect to other ECAs around the world. (In his cover letter to the
competition report for 2000, U.S. Ex-Im President and Chair-
man, James Harmon, remarked, "U.S. exporters are frequently
disadvantaged as a result of more flexible and aggressive compet-
itor ECAs' practices and policies"). While this competitive cli-
mate pushes ECAs to expand the scope of their activities and the
benefits offered to exporters (within the OECD and WTO regu-
latory framework), ECAs might have pressed too far with regard
to project finance and commercial risk insurance.
II. PROJECT FINANCE, RISK MANA GEMENT,
AND INSURANCE
Risk analysis, as well as the allocation and management of
those risks, represent the core of any project finance transaction.
Risk is allocated to various contracting parties through the multi-
tude of agreements that comprises a project finance deal, and
among other methods of addressing risk, insurance policies of
various types allow parties to manage risk allocated to them.
Such insurance can generally be divided into two categories:
commercial and political.4
Political risk insurance comes in different forms but gener-
ally covers three principal types of risk: currency convertibility
and transfer risk, expropriation and other forms of government
intervention, and political violence such as war. Purveyors of
"pure" political risk insurance include the United States Over-
3. One stated goal of U.S. Ex-Im, for example, is to "level the playing field" for U.S.
exporters, off-setting subsidies or other benefits enjoyed by foreign exporters of com-
peting products.
4. These types of insurance are in addition to "normal" indemnity and civil liability
insurance, which this Essay does not discuss.
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seas Private Investment Corporation ("OPIC"), the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency ("MIGA") of the World Bank, and
others, including the private insurance market. As mentioned
above, ECAs also have long provided political risk insurance.
U.S. Ex-Im, for example, has offered political risk coverage since
Congress authorized it to issue insurance and reinsurance in
1961.
Commercial risk insurance covers a variety of commercial
risks. Most commonly, such policies will cover the risk of non-
payment, delayed payment, or other default of the buyer for cer-
tain non-political reasons, including insolvency or other finan-
cial inability to pay. Such policies come in a variety of flavors
(depending, of course, on the particular provider) -covering
short, medium, or long-term risks; single or multiple buyers; and
single and repetitive sales-and can take the form of either in-
surance or guarantees. Coverage also is available for commercial
risks involved in foreign direct investment, including equity in-
vestment, loans and guarantees, and the acquisition of fixed as-
sets. Rights under such policies are typically assignable (i.e., to
banks) so that exporters will be able to obtain more favorable
financing terms.
This Essay is concerned particularly with ECAs and commer-
cial risk insurance as they relate to project finance, rather than
to short-term export/import trade-the traditional focus of
ECAs. ECAs increasingly have become involved in project
financings over the past decade as project finance has rapidly
gained importance as a favored means of investment in new in-
frastructure in both the developing and the developed worlds.
Indeed, the OECD Arrangement (which establishes regulatory
guidelines for ECAs operating in OECD countries) is currently
in a three-year test period, during which it is evaluating a policy
of flexibility with respect to the dictates of the Arrangement in
project finance transactions. In project finance, as compared to
general export/import trade, the stakes of transactions tend to
be higher and the deals are typically more complicated, longer
term, and more sensitive both financially and politically. Also,
project financings typically involve a special purpose vehicle
whose only asset is the project being promoted and which has no
possibility of repaying any borrowings incurred in connection
with the construction of the project otherwise than out of reve-
nues generated by the project (or the proceeds of any indemnity
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insurances taken out in connection therewith). Thus, the OECD
and various ECAs have noted that project finance transactions
merit different considerations from international trade as such.
As a result, the analysis put forth here with respect to project
finance transactions cannot be directly applied to commercial
risk insurance in non-project finance transactions.
III. ANALYSIS: IS ECA-PROVDED COMMERCIAL RISK
INSURANCE A GOOD IDEA?
The purpose of this Essay is to argue that ECA-provided
commercial risk insurance may not be a good idea because it
may skew the process of commercial risk analysis and may lead to
the promotion of projects that do not make good commercial
sense. There is nothing inherently bad about commercial risk
insurance per se. (Although one can argue that for projects that
are genuinely commercially sound it is basically unnecessary,
and thus represents inefficient use of limited financial re-
sources-the cost of commercial risk insurance typically ranging
from 5% to 8% of the amount insured.) Where the commercial
risk assessment and pricing of insurance premia are market-
driven, such risk insurance may be an adequate (though ineffi-
cient) 5 substitute. A problem arises, however, when the provider
of commercial risk insurance is not a genuine market partici-
pant. Commercial risk insurance provided by ECAs cannot oper-
ate as a substitute for the traditional risk assessment process.
In project finance, the funds provided by lenders provide
the wherewithal to promote the project (often in excess of 70%
of the capital cost of the project). In a typical project finance
transaction, these lenders will conduct a rigorous commercial
analysis of the project, testing the commercial viability (the abil-
ity and the extent to which the project can generate revenue) of
the project under various scenarios. Such lenders operate in a
competitive, market environment and will finance only those
project companies that demonstrate a reasonable certainty that
they can repay the funds they borrow. This analysis serves to vet
the good projects from the bad, selecting those that make com-
mercial sense from those that do not. This process leads to the
5. It is inefficient because it should be largely unnecessary for a commercially
sound project. At best, the insurance provider will duplicate the analysis that the com-
mercial banks have been providing, increasing fees without any concomitant gain.
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good health not only of the lenders but also the various parties
to the transaction and, indeed, the economy of the host country.
Commercial viability is the foundation of the logic of project fi-
nance.
6
When commercial risk insurance appears on the scene, this
situation changes. The lenders will no longer rely solely upon
the commercial soundness of the project but will also look to the
soundness of the insurance policy. Due to the support offered
by the insurance policy, the lenders may overlook shortcomings
in the commercial prospects of the project. While the banks will
still conduct an analysis of the project, the insurance policy may
reduce the rigor required in such analysis where no insurance
policy exists. The responsibility for appraising the commercial
soundness of the project may pass from the lenders to the insur-
ance provider. But where the insurer does not have a long his-
tory of conducting commercial risk analysis, where it is not a
fully commercial entity, where its incentives come not from the
market but from the government, then the insurer's analysis may
not be a reliable substitute.
ECAs have developed an institutional expertise in the area
of export credit lending and in some insurance products. They
have not done so in the area of long-term commercial risk insur-
ance. While ECAs have played an important role through their
traditional export credit services, they have yet to build up the
expertise in the kind of complex, long-term commercial risk
analysis that is necessary for project finance. One may counter
that many ECAs have been involved in offering commercial risk
insurance for a number of years (even if only for shorter terms
and less complex structures) or that ECAs without sufficient
background may simply hire personnel from other institutions
that do have such experience. But this lack of expertise is not
just a question of training of personnel. Even where ECAs can
attract personnel with the "right" experience,' the perspective of
risk analysts at ECAs will differ from those at commercial banks.
As discussed above, ECAs are motivated in their activities by a
6. This Essay does not discuss the motives of multilateral agencies (e.g., IFC, 1DB,
ADB, etc.) in entering project finance transactions; however, they also provide quasi-
political and commercial risk cover, but this is entirely consistent with their develop-
mental objectives.
7. One might question the degree of success that ECAs will have in attracting
highly qualified personnel from highly paying positions in commercial banks.
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desire to promote exports and (to a lesser extent) a desire to
promote foreign policy goals. Their risk analysis, therefore, may
be oriented towards promoting these goals, at least in part,
rather than making a commercial return on the policies issued 8
(i.e., the risk is that the analysis may be "softer" and more forgiv-
ing). Thus the problem can be characterized (and com-
pounded) as a lack of experience coupled with the possibility of
a non-commercial orientation towards what pretends to be and
ought to be a strictly commercial analysis. The ECAs' analysis
can be argued to be an inadequate substitute for that of the com-
mercial banks. The commercial lending market is the best-
suited place to distinguish those projects that from a commercial
viewpoint, merit financing from those that do not.
The imperfect substitution of the ECAs' commercial risk
analysis and insurance for the analysis of commercial lenders can
be argued to lead to a poor outcome from the perspectives of
both the ECA and the project's host country. It represents a
poor outcome for the host country because it distorts many of
the benefits that project finance offers to developing countries.
Because project finance is "off balance sheet," it provides a
method by which developing countries can proceed with infra-
structure development programs at a time of limited financial
resources. This can be a great boon to the developing country
in that such projects (in addition to providing infrastructure
needed for development) can be a catalyst for additional foreign
and domestic investment; can help to develop ancillary indus-
tries; and can help to develop the private sector and, indeed, the
free market. But where projects do not make commercial sense,
they tend to fail. Where projects fail those benevolent effects
just mentioned are reversed. Failed projects discourage future
investment, cause follow-on industries to fail, and increase pub-
lic sector involvement in, and regulation of, the economy,
among other detrimental effects.
It also represents a poor outcome for the ECA for several
reasons. First, as mentioned above, ECAs operate under the
WTO requirement that they at least break even in their activities
(to prevent ECA support from operating as a type of concealed
trade subsidy). An ECA's exposure in a single project finance
transaction may exceed an ECA's total premium income for a
8. Notwithstanding the "no-loss" WTO requirements.
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year, and potential losses could imperil the ECA's profitability if
its commercial risk analysis is not entirely sound. Second, it is
the stated policy of U.S. Ex-Im not to engage in "trade dis-
torting" activities. To the extent that an ECA's commercial risk
insurance may promote the export of goods that are "second
best" (because the benefit of the insurance policy enables them
to beat out superior export goods offered by a competitor in
another country backed by a less aggressive ECA), such policies
will promote trade distortions.9 Third, to the extent that the
ECA is motivated by the goal of promoting its country's foreign
policy, a failed project creates little, if any, goodwill in other
countries.
Correspondingly, it is important to acknowledge that this is
not altogether a bad outcome for the commercial lenders. Com-
mercial lenders desire security in their investments above all else
(indeed at a recent infrastructure conference in Frankfurt one
speaker complained that it was almost an "article of faith"
amongst commercial banks not to accept any risk). If they can
obtain that security through a sovereign guarantee over a com-
mercially questionable project, that represents a fully acceptable
(or preferable) substitute to reliance on the revenue of a com-
mercially dubious project from the bank's perspective.
IV. EFFECTS OF SOFT COMMERCIAL VIABILITY
When commercial risk insurance enables projects to pro-
ceed that would not otherwise be commercially viable, it creates
several problems. First, to the extent that the benefit acts as a
form of foreign assistance, project finance represents a poor
method of providing such aid.' ° Project finance deals tend to
involve substantial transaction costs. If the risk of commercial
9. An analogy may be drawn between ECAs' support of "tied aid" (trade related aid
credit provided by donor governments for public sector projects in developing coun-
tries that is conditioned on the purchase of equipment from suppliers in the donor
country) and their foray into commercial risk insurance. Just as tied aid may distort a
buyer's decision-making process so that it will purchase "second best" materials that
come with financing rather than first choice materials without financing, commercial
risk insurance can be seen to distort commercial incentives so that projects that would
not otherwise be commercially viable will be pursued.
10. Project finance is profoundly different from foreign aid in that project financ-
ing is done with "hard money" (i.e., investments that anticipate a market or above-
market rate of return) while foreign aid is done with "soft money" (i.e., donor govern-
ment subsidized aid) and so need not be overly concerned with market pressures.
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default is high, perhaps the transaction would be better struc-
tured as direct foreign assistance, thus avoiding the added costs
involved in setting up the complex contractual web that charac-
terizes project finance. Furthermore, pursuing infrastructure
development on a project finance basis means that the host gov-
ernment will retain less control over the project than it would
through traditional sovereign lending foreign aid. While this ar-
guably could be seen as a benefit from a free-market perspective,
it also means that the project will be tailored toward commercial
goals rather than toward any other goals that the host govern-
ment may have.
Next, where a project finance deal relies on commercial risk
insurance to make the project viable, "structural" problems may
be created because such insurance is not a direct substitute for
commercial viability per se. In the event that the insurer must
pay out on a claim, it will expect a certain amount of control
(voting rights) over the project in return for its payment and
indeed in some cases the "ultimate" taker of the risk demands
the right to take the decisions even before paying out on any
claim. The financing banks, on the other hand, will want to re-
tain control over the decision-making process and will want to
cede little if any of their control to the insurer. This state of
affairs will at best lead to inefficiency and slowdown in the deci-
sion-making process and at worst to a kind of distortion of the
decision-making process, whereby the decisions over the project
are no longer made on a strictly commercial basis.
V. SUGGESTIONS
While this Essay has argued that ECAs should not provide
commercial risk insurance, it is left to suggest what can be done
about this situation. Given the ECAs' attempt to create a "level
playing field" for their countries' exporters, no single ECA can
be expected (no matter how sound the reasoning) to cease pro-
viding commercial risk insurance for project finance transac-
tions unless all of the other ECAs do so as well. There exists a
type of "prisoners' dilemma": because there exists competition
between ECAs, with each promoting the products of its home
exporters, it will be exceedingly difficult to convince one ECA to
stop providing commercial risk insurance while it believes that
other ECAs will continue to do so.
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If ECAs are to withdraw from this line of business, it must be
done simultaneously. For this reason, we cannot expect domes-
tic regulators to provide a solution. Instead, we could look to
the OECD and the WTO, as applicable. As mentioned previ-
ously, the OECD Arrangement regulates ECAs activities. Collec-
tive change could be introduced through a change in the provi-
sions of the Arrangement that require all ECAs offering com-
mercial risk insurance in project finance transactions to stop at
once, and thus avoiding competitive concerns between the
ECAs. To capture those ECAs not subject to the OECD Arrange-
ment, similar provisions would need to be introduced through
the WTO.
A possible alternative to banning the extension by ECAs of
commercial risk insurance in project finance transactions may
be a form of co-operation between ECAs and commercial risk
insurers. The commercial risk insurers analyze the commercial
risks involved in a project and, if acceptable, join with the ECA
in providing a comprehensive insurance package. The ECAs
cover the political risk and the commercial insurers cover the
purely commercial risks." Through such cooperation, ECAs
would avoid the need to conduct their own commercial risk
analysis, and the sponsors of commercially viable projects would
enjoy (market based) commercial risk cover for those risks that
they feel they cannot accept. This solution nevertheless may still
be argued as inefficient, including as it does the payment of sig-
nificant commercial risk premia, which, if the project were com-
mercially viable in its own right, would be avoided.
CONCLUSION
This Essay has argued that ECAs' expansion of their com-
mercial risk insurance products into the realm of project fi-
nance, coupled with the different commercial orientation of
ECAs, may in some circumstances lead to the pursuit of projects
that are not commercially viable. No amount of improvement of
their skills in analyzing commercial risk will avoid the charge
11. This is not without precedent. For example, U.S. Ex-Im has in the past cooper-
ated with private insurers and reinsurers through the Foreign Credit Insurance Agency.
U.S. Ex-Im combined its services with private insurers to offer comprehensive insurance
packages in which it (U.S. Ex-Im) offered political risk insurance while the private in-
surers offered commercial risk insurance.
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that such analysis of ECAs, each of which is prepared to go the
extra mile to promote the export of goods and services from its
country, represents a "skewed" commercial perspective. This
may lead to the approval of projects that are not (without such
insurance) commercially viable, and that may, in turn, lead to
poor results for both the ECA and the host country. This Essay
suggests, therefore, that ECAs should either cease to provide
such commercial risk insurance (or be prohibited through ap-
propriate regulation), or should do so only in cooperation with
private insurers (who would conduct the commercial risk analy-
sis). By doing so, we would help to ensure one of the most basic
principles of project finance-commercial viability.
